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CITIZENS UNITED AND THE THREAT 
TO THE REGULATORY STATE 
Tamara R. Piety*† 
Introduction 
Although Citizens United1 has been roundly criticized for its potential 
effect on elections and its display of judicial immodesty (or “activism”), the 
effect of the case which may be both most profound and perhaps most per-
nicious is its effect on the commercial speech doctrine. This is an aspect of 
the case which has been largely overlooked. Most people seem to be una-
ware of any connection between election law and the commercial speech 
doctrine—except, that is, those who have been working long and hard to 
accomplish the change it foreshadows. They are keenly aware of its implica-
tions. 
The opinion in Citizens United is replete with rhetoric identifying corpo-
rations as “citizens,” as if they were real persons. This characterization 
bolsters arguments for treating commercial speech like fully protected 
speech because it trains the analysis on the speaker instead of the listener. 
The majority of the Court is sympathetic to the argument for more protec-
tion for commercial speech and Citizens United reflects that sympathy. It 
suggests that with the proper case, there is an increased likelihood the Su-
preme Court will either do away with the commercial speech doctrine 
altogether and declare that commercial speech should be treated as fully 
protected speech, or it will nominally retain the doctrine but apply strict 
scrutiny review. Either development (and they are really the same) would 
likely strangle in their infancy recent and proposed regulatory reforms such 
as the new tobacco regulation,2 the financial reform act which includes 
changes intended to protect consumers from abusive or misleading credit 
marketing practices3 and the Interagency Agency Working Group on Foods 
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 Suggested citation: Tamara R. Piety, Commentary, Citizens United and the Threat 
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 1. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). 
 3. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, Title X, § 1031. 
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Marketed to Children4 proposing minimal nutritional standards for foods mar-
keted to children, to name just a few. If that claim seems somewhat alarmist, 
it isn’t. If you cannot regulate commercial speech, you cannot regulate 
commerce. Period. 
I. The Connection Between Commercial 
and Corporate Speech 
To the uninitiated, commercial speech law and campaign finance reform 
law seem unrelated. Yet the two are closely linked. The commercial speech 
doctrine was established in 1976 by Virginia Pharmacy.5 It provided for li-
mited protection of truthful commercial speech (a category previously not 
protected at all) on the grounds that truthful commercial speech was impor-
tant to consumers and thus critical to market function. Only two years later 
the Supreme Court decided First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.6 
Bellotti involved a law prohibiting certain types of corporate political adver-
tising. The Court struck down the Massachusetts law at issue and in so 
doing announced, “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”7 It was not long be-
fore this language (and similar formulations) in Bellotti began appearing in 
arguments in favor of full First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech, including the 2003 Nike v. Kasky case.8 
Use of the Bellotti rhetoric, with its focus on the speaker and antidiscri-
mination principles, turns the commercial speech doctrine on its head. The 
doctrine started as a modest extension of First Amendment protection for 
some commercial speech due to its value to consumers and listeners. It was 
accompanied by deferential judicial review. But over the years the doctrine 
has been subtly  refashioned, with allusions to Bellotti, as protection for 
commercial speech based on its intrinsic value as “speech.” As this framing 
gained ground it was accompanied by increased judicial skepticism toward 
regulation. In just a few decades, governmental regulation of commercial 
speech has gone from an unremarkable aspect of Congress’s power to regu-
late commerce to an almost presumptively illegitimate abridgment of 
freedom of expression, with regulators on the defensive against aggressive 
First Amendment attacks. This shift is of a piece with the embrace of dere-
                                                                                                                      
 4. The interagency group is made up of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDCP”), Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to 
Children, Tentative Proposed Nutrition Standards (2009), http://ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ 
sizingup/SNAC_PAC.pdf. 
 5. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 6. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 7. Id. at 777 (emphasis added). 
 8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Freedom in Support of Petitioners at 23, 
539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575 ) (per curiam), 2003 WL 835292. 
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gulation generally in the latter part of the twentieth century. In the wake of 
spectacular corporate failures and malfeasance, deregulation is less appeal-
ing today. There is renewed interest in greater governmental oversight with 
respect to areas like food and product safety, securities and banking, the 
environment, and others where the unfettered market appears to be  inade-
quate to protect the public interest. Yet the intellectual and legal apparatus 
that created the commercial speech doctrine and led to Citizens United may 
prop up the laissez-faire approach to regulation even as its shortcomings 
become manifest. 
II. Origins 
Virginia Pharmacy, the decision which created the commercial speech 
doctrine, was issued after Justice Powell joined the Court. Powell had served 
as legal counsel to some of America’s largest businesses. He felt strongly 
that the free enterprise system in America was under assault. In his view this 
assault required a coordinated defense. To this end, in 1971 he wrote a 
memo to the chairman of the educational committee of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce entitled “Confidential Memorandum: Attack on American Free 
Enterprise System.”9 In the memo Powell outlined a multipronged plan by 
which American business could improve its standing with society. He ad-
vised industry to fund research, lobby, sponsor discussions in university 
settings, shape the representations of business in the media through public 
relations, fund strategic litigation, and offer proposed drafts of legislation 
which would be more hospitable to business.  
Now, almost forty years later, it seems that industry followed all of Pow-
ell’s recommendations. Certainly cases like Nike v. Kasky illustrate this 
strategy in full flower. In Nike, numerous amicus briefs were submitted by 
industry lobbying organizations like the Association of National Advertising 
and the National Association of Manufacturers, as well as by some of the 
world’s largest corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Microsoft. They all cited 
Bellotti. Similarly, many of the scholarly articles arguing for more protec-
tion for commercial speech were written by practicing lawyers, suggesting 
that in some cases, firms have underwritten the cost in attorney billable 
hours needed to write these articles to advance clients’ strategic interests. 
Alas, there are fewer clients paying for advocacy on behalf of the public. 
And those which exist (except the government itself) have far fewer re-
sources. 
These efforts have “moved the ball,” making freedom of commercial ex-
pression seem both inevitable and necessary when it is neither. Perhaps 
because Virginia Pharmacy was a case brought by a consumer group, its 
holding seemed “proconsumer” and the doctrine’s enormous benefits to 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Robert A.G. Monks, Corpocracy: How CEOs and The Business Roundtable Hijacked the 
World’s Greatest Wealth Machine—and How to Get it Back 43-54 (2008); see also The Powell 
Memo: Text and Analysis, ReclaimDemocracy.org, Apr. 23, 2004, http://reclaimdemocracy.org/ 
corporate_accountability/powell_memo_lewis.html. 
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business were not so apparent. They are today. The commercial speech doc-
trine gave constitutional cover to a wealth of commercial propaganda that 
cannot sensibly be described as “informational,” even as it purported to pro-
tect the government’s power to regulate commercial speech for its truth. 
Consumers have much to fear from misleading or false commercial speech. 
Yet under the onslaught of the antidiscrimination rhetoric, government pow-
er to protect them from it has been slowly eroded. 
III. The Corporation as Speaker 
Some of commercial speech’s defenders argue that intermediate scrutiny 
of commercial speech represents viewpoint discrimination. But this claim 
turns the rationale for extending protection on its head. Virginia Pharmacy 
focused on listeners’ interest in the information, not the speaker’s desire to 
communicate it. In contrast, the viewpoint discrimination argument fore-
grounds the speaker; it presumes, albeit indirectly, a human subject who as a 
moral actor should be protected from discriminatory suppression of his or 
her self-expression. It treats the speech rights as “belonging” to the speak-
er—not as protected on behalf of the listener.  
Viewpoints don’t matter in a vacuum. There are only two reasons to be 
concerned about regulation of content or viewpoint. One is that the content 
is valuable to listeners. The other is that suppression offends the dignity of 
the speaker. If content is harmful to the listener, protection cannot be justi-
fied by reference to the listener’s interests. And if the speaker is not a moral 
subject, protection cannot be justified on the grounds of his (its) expressive 
interests. Yet this is a consequence of the sleight-of-hand involved in focus-
ing on content—it treats the corporate speaker as if it were a moral subject 
which possesses rights as an attribute of personhood, and it frames restric-
tions on communication based on the speaker’s identity as invidious 
discrimination. 
While the Court has not yet explicitly grounded protection for commer-
cial speech in the speaker’s rights, it has gotten perilously close in Bellotti 
and again in Citizens United, with the suggestion that distinctions between 
corporations and persons (or between different types of corporations) are 
discriminatory. But if a for-profit corporation is entitled to full First 
Amendment protection when it engages in political speech—speech which 
is in some sense peripheral to its existence—then it would seem full protec-
tion for its core expressive activity should follow. The core expressive 
activity of a for-profit corporation is commercial speech. If the Court wants 
to avoid distinguishing between high- and low-value speech, and is inclined 
to treat for-profit corporations as speakers with full First Amendment rights, 
then full protection for commercial speech seems virtually inevitable. 
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IV. Tobacco Litigation and Regulation 
Predictably, Citizens United has already cropped up in some commercial 
speech cases. In United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,10 the government 
sued several tobacco companies, alleging a pattern of racketeering based on 
activities taken in concert to conceal information about the health conse-
quences of smoking, secondhand smoke, and the addictive properties of 
nicotine; deceptive marketing practices; marketing to children; and several 
other deceptive, fraudulent or harmful practices. After a long bench trial the 
judge issued a lengthy opinion, containing exhaustively documented find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, largely in favor of the government. The 
decision was affirmed in 2009.11 
The defendants unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for review 
claiming, among other things, that the prosecution violated the companies’ 
First Amendment rights. The gist of their argument, as echoed in an amicus 
brief filed by the Washington Legal Foundation,12 was that much of the mis-
leading speech at issue was released in the form of editorials, op-eds, and 
press releases. These are forms of expression which  are traditionally pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and, because they involved issues of “public 
concern,” the tobacco companies argued that the statements should be 
treated as fully protected speech. Citizens United was cited as support for 
the proposition that the government could not “discriminate” against corpo-
rate speakers. 
Consider what this means. The government alleged and the trial court 
found that much of this “information” was knowingly false and misleading. 
The press releases and other so-called informational pamphlets (some of 
which were sent to schoolchildren), purported to educate the public about 
the “debate” on the health consequences of smoking. In fact they did no 
such thing. They were disseminated  to manufacture a controversy. There is 
scientific consensus about the premise that smoking causes serious health 
problems. The defendants’ strategy in attacking this premise, succinctly cap-
tured in one internal memo, was to sow doubt and confusion, rather than to 
educate and inform: “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of 
competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general pub-
lic.”13 In short, the tobacco companies asserted a constitutional right to 
obfuscate public information about a product for which there is no safe level 
                                                                                                                      
 10. 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 11. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
78 U.S.L.W. 3501, 78 U.S.L.W. 3759 & 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. 2010). 
 12. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and National Association of Manufacturers as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. United States, 78 U.S.L.W. 3501, 
78 U.S.L.W. 3759 & 78 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. 2010) (Nos. 09-976, 09-977, 09-1012), 2010 WL 
1130087. 
 13. Phillip Morris, 449 F. Supp. 2d at 191–92, ¶ 726 (D.D.C. 2006) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing internal Brown & Williamson document). 
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of use. It is difficult to conceive of a construction by which the right to sow 
confusion about such a product is founded on the interests of the listeners. 
Although the Supreme Court denied review of this case, the issue will 
arise again in litigation over the new law giving the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (“FDA”) jurisdiction over tobacco.14 For example, in 
Commonwealth Brands v. FDA,15 several tobacco companies (and related 
businesses) challenged the law, claiming its restrictions on tobacco advertis-
ing and packaging violated the First Amendment. The district court held that 
the law’s ban on color and graphics in packaging and advertisements, and on 
references to the FDA (which might imply governmental assurances of safe-
ty), did violate the First Amendment because they were overbroad. Citizens 
United and the judicial philosophy toward corporate interests which it re-
flects will undoubtedly be invoked in subsequent appeals of this ruling and 
in future cases involving other products which may present a hazard to the 
public, such as soft drinks, junk food, pharmaceuticals, and alcohol. Tobac-
co is a product which wreaks havoc on public health, particularly when 
advertising is either aimed at or peripherally affects children, but that does 
not mean that prohibition is the right response. Nevertheless, it does not fol-
low from a rejection of prohibition that we are compelled to permit 
completely unrestrained promotion of dangerous products. 
V. The Consequences of Strict Scrutiny 
As the Commonwealth case demonstrates, even under the current inter-
mediate scrutiny test for commercial speech, a great deal of advertising 
which is arguably of little, or even negative, informational value will be pro-
tected. And some claim that increasing First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech will not affect the government’s ability to regulate false 
speech. But this is not true for two reasons. First, many advertisements do 
not offer factual claims that may be tested for their truth, but they may still 
be misleading—for example,  when cigarette ads portray smokers as un-
iformly young, attractive, and healthy. The government has a legitimate 
interest in regulating misleading as well as false commercial speech. 
Second, high procedural and evidentiary barriers, like those imposed in New 
York Times v. Sullivan,16 will likely leave the government with a theoretical 
power to regulate, backed up by little in the way of practical ability to liti-
gate. As prominent First Amendment scholar Fred Schauer recently 
observed, facts matter in the First Amendment. But where judges are hostile 
to the general proposition of regulation, facts are also susceptible to being 
dismissed or minimized. This happened in Citizens United when the Court 
rejected the argument about the appearance of corruption of the electoral 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). 
 15. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. FDA, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010). 
 16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
PIETY FINAL 8/12/2010 11:20 AM 
22 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 109:16 
 
process, where multinational corporations are permitted to participate on the 
same terms as individual citizens.17 
Conclusion 
The Citizens United opinion, with its rhetorical framing of corporations 
as “citizens,” provides ammunition for those arguing that commercial 
speech ought to receive full First Amendment protection. The antidiscrimi-
nation rhetoric is troubling because it provides cover for the Court’s use of 
its countermajoritarian power on behalf of the powerful rather than against 
them. Full protection for commercial speech would threaten many of the 
regulatory initiatives of the last couple of years. 
Given the disastrous corporate collapses of the last few years, it is evi-
dent the market cannot always be relied upon to protect the public. False and 
misleading commercial speech poisons the informational environment. Like 
an out-of-control oil well, large corporate interests inject vast amounts of 
“noise” (false and misleading speech) into the public sphere, every day, vir-
tually unchecked. As we have seen with tobacco, this informational 
pollution can have significant negative consequences for public health, safe-
ty, and economic stability. Full First Amendment protection of this speech 
seems likely to make things worse. Can it really be the case that respect for 
freedom of expression makes the government powerless to combat informa-
tional pollution? In another First Amendment case, Justice Jackson 
famously warned the Court not to turn the Bill of Rights into “a suicide 
pact.” But constitutional protection for commercial speech might do just 
that.  
                                                                                                                      
 17. This decision is in some tension with the Court’s holding in Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., that millions of dollars in campaign contributions from a litigant required a judge to re-
cuse himself because “the probability of actual bias” rose to an unconstitutional level. 129 S. Ct. 
2252 (2010). 
